

Towards a complete cohomology invariant for contextuality

Giovanni Carù

Quantum Group
Department of Computer Science
University of Oxford


Quantum Contextuality in Quantum Mechanics and Beyond
Prague, 20 May 2018




DEPARTMENT OF
**COMPUTER
SCIENCE**



- 1 **Contextuality** and “**impossible figures**”: a **topological viewpoint**.




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
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
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
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
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
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Example: the **Hardy model**.

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- Such a **possibility table** is called a **possibilistic empirical model**.

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
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- In other words, the state of the whole system is determined by a **hidden variable** λ , whose value is independent of Alice and Bob's choices.

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
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


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


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


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


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No predetermined global assignment!

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Fine but ...

What does topology have to do with this?


Bundle diagrams

Bundle diagrams

A	B	00	10	01	11
a_1	b_1				
a_1	b_2				
a_2	b_1				
a_2	b_2				


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
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
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Hardy model


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
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
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
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
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
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b_2	b_2	0	1	1	1
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


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The Hardy model is **Contextual** at the red **section**




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

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However, a portion of the model can be explained deterministically





Bundle diagrams

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Bundle diagrams


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Bundle diagrams

PR-Box model


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
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
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


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This model is contextual at **every section**. We say that it is **strongly contextual**



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
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
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
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- The bundle diagram representation of empirical models helps us understand contextuality as a **topological feature**.
- No-signalling corresponds to the fact that **each local section can always be extended to its adjacent contexts**. In other words, the diagram is **locally consistent**.
- Contextuality corresponds to the **impossibility of extending a local feature to a global one**. This means that the diagram is **globally inconsistent**.
- Therefore, contextuality of no-signalling empirical models can be loosely interpreted as a **discrepancy between local consistency and global inconsistency**, which is ultimately a **topological property**:





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- It has been studied in detail using **sheaf theory** and **sheaf cohomology**

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- **This is exactly what we are looking for!**

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
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- However, this ‘abelianisation’ gives rise to a significant amount of **false positives**.

False positives

Hardy model


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
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


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
The possibility of **linearly adding sections** allows us to find a global section (for \mathcal{F}) containing the red section. Thus cohomology does not detect contextuality in this case!



False positives



False positives

A strongly contextual model which is cohomologically non-contextual





This model presents a false positive **for every single local section.**



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A new perspective: joint scenarios

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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
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
Example




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
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
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

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

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

Example





Example




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

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
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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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

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- Therefore, for cyclic models, cohomology is a complete invariant for contextuality.

Extending the invariant to general models

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where n is the size of the cycle responsible for the contextuality of the model.

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In other words, we strongly suspect the invariant is in fact **universal**.

Examples: solving well-known false positives




Figure: The Hardy model

Examples: solving well-known false positives




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


Figure: The first joint model of the Hardy model

Examples: solving well-known false positives




Figure: The third joint model of the Hardy model

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




Figure: The third joint model of the Hardy model


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**Thank you for your
attention! Questions?**