

Simulations of quantum resources and the degrees of contextuality

Samson Abramsky

Joint work with Rui Soares Barbosa, Martti Karvonen and Shane Mansfield

Department of Computer Science, University of Oxford

Overview

We will look at contextuality as a **resource**: how can we use it, what can we do with it?

Overview

We will look at contextuality as a **resource**: how can we use it, what can we do with it?

From this perspective, we want to compare contextual behaviours:

- Are they essentially the same?
- Is one more powerful than another?

Overview

We will look at contextuality as a **resource**: how can we use it, what can we do with it?

From this perspective, we want to compare contextual behaviours:

- Are they essentially the same?
- Is one more powerful than another?

Based on the paper *A comonadic view of simulation and quantum resources* by SA, Rui Soares Barbosa, Martti Karvonen and Shane Mansfield, to appear in Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LiCS) 2019.

Overview

We will look at contextuality as a **resource**: how can we use it, what can we do with it?


From this perspective, we want to compare contextual behaviours:

- Are they essentially the same?
- Is one more powerful than another?

Based on the paper *A comonadic view of simulation and quantum resources* by SA, Rui Soares Barbosa, Martti Karvonen and Shane Mansfield, to appear in Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LiCS) 2019.

We will give an overview. The talk by Martti will go further into details of results.

Alice-Bob games



The XOR Game

Alice and Bob play a cooperative game against Verifier (or Nature!):

The XOR Game

Alice and Bob play a cooperative game against Verifier (or Nature!):

- Verifier chooses an input $x \in \{0, 1\}$ for Alice, and similarly an input y for Bob. We assume the uniform distribution for Nature's choices.

The XOR Game

Alice and Bob play a cooperative game against Verifier (or Nature!):

- Verifier chooses an input $x \in \{0, 1\}$ for Alice, and similarly an input y for Bob. We assume the uniform distribution for Nature's choices.
- Alice and Bob each have to choose an output, $a \in \{0, 1\}$ for Alice, $b \in \{0, 1\}$ for Bob, depending on their input. They are **not allowed to communicate during the game**.

The XOR Game

Alice and Bob play a cooperative game against Verifier (or Nature!):

- Verifier chooses an input $x \in \{0, 1\}$ for Alice, and similarly an input y for Bob. We assume the uniform distribution for Nature's choices.
- Alice and Bob each have to choose an output, $a \in \{0, 1\}$ for Alice, $b \in \{0, 1\}$ for Bob, depending on their input. They are **not allowed to communicate during the game**.
- The winning condition: $a \oplus b = x \wedge y$.

The XOR Game

Alice and Bob play a cooperative game against Verifier (or Nature!):

- Verifier chooses an input $x \in \{0, 1\}$ for Alice, and similarly an input y for Bob. We assume the uniform distribution for Nature's choices.
- Alice and Bob each have to choose an output, $a \in \{0, 1\}$ for Alice, $b \in \{0, 1\}$ for Bob, depending on their input. They are **not allowed to communicate during the game**.
- The winning condition: $a \oplus b = x \wedge y$.

A table of conditional probabilities $p(a, b|x, y)$ defines a **probabilistic strategy** for this game. The **success probability** for this strategy is:

$$\begin{aligned} &1/4[p(a = b|x = 0, y = 0) + p(a = b|x = 0, y = 1) + p(a = b|x = 1, y = 0) \\ &\quad + p(a \neq b|x = 1, y = 1)] \end{aligned}$$

A Strategy for the Alice-Bob game

A Strategy for the Alice-Bob game

Example: The Bell Model

A	B	(0,0)	(1,0)	(0,1)	(1,1)
0	0	$1/2$	0	0	$1/2$
0	1	$3/8$	$1/8$	$1/8$	$3/8$
1	0	$3/8$	$1/8$	$1/8$	$3/8$
1	1	$1/8$	$3/8$	$3/8$	$1/8$

A Strategy for the Alice-Bob game

Example: The Bell Model

A	B	(0,0)	(1,0)	(0,1)	(1,1)
0	0	1/2	0	0	1/2
0	1	3/8	1/8	1/8	3/8
1	0	3/8	1/8	1/8	3/8
1	1	1/8	3/8	3/8	1/8

The entry in row 2 column 3 says:

If the Verifier sends Alice a_1 and Bob b_2 , then with probability $1/8$, Alice outputs a 0 and Bob outputs a 1.

A Strategy for the Alice-Bob game

Example: The Bell Model

A	B	(0,0)	(1,0)	(0,1)	(1,1)
0	0	1/2	0	0	1/2
0	1	3/8	1/8	1/8	3/8
1	0	3/8	1/8	1/8	3/8
1	1	1/8	3/8	3/8	1/8

The entry in row 2 column 3 says:

If the Verifier sends Alice a_1 and Bob b_2 , then with probability $1/8$, Alice outputs a 0 and Bob outputs a 1.

This gives a winning probability of $\frac{3.25}{4} \approx 0.81$.

A Strategy for the Alice-Bob game

Example: The Bell Model

The entry in row 2 column 3 says:

If the Verifier sends Alice a_1 and Bob b_2 , then with probability $1/8$, Alice outputs a 0 and Bob outputs a 1.

This gives a winning probability of $\frac{3.25}{4} \approx 0.81$.

The optimal classical probability is 0.75!

A Strategy for the Alice-Bob game

Example: The Bell Model

The entry in row 2 column 3 says:

If the Verifier sends Alice a_1 and Bob b_2 , then with probability $1/8$, Alice outputs a 0 and Bob outputs a 1.

This gives a winning probability of $\frac{3.25}{4} \approx 0.81$.

The optimal classical probability is 0.75!

The proof of this uses (and is essentially the same as) the use of **Bell inequalities**.

A Strategy for the Alice-Bob game

Example: The Bell Model

The entry in row 2 column 3 says:

If the Verifier sends Alice a_1 and Bob b_2 , then with probability $1/8$, Alice outputs a 0 and Bob outputs a 1.

This gives a winning probability of $\frac{3.25}{4} \approx 0.81$.

The optimal classical probability is 0.75!

The proof of this uses (and is essentially the same as) the use of **Bell inequalities**.

The Bell table exceeds this bound. Since it is **quantum realizable** using an entangled pair of qubits, it shows that quantum resources yield a **quantum advantage** in an information-processing task.

The Mermin Magic Square

The Mermin Magic Square

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>
<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>

The Mermin Magic Square

A	B	C
D	E	F
G	H	I

The values we can observe for these variables are 0 or 1.

The Mermin Magic Square

<i>A</i>	<i>B</i>	<i>C</i>
<i>D</i>	<i>E</i>	<i>F</i>
<i>G</i>	<i>H</i>	<i>I</i>

The values we can observe for these variables are 0 or 1.

We require that each row and the first two columns have even parity, and the final column has odd parity.

The Mermin Magic Square

A	B	C
D	E	F
G	H	I

The values we can observe for these variables are 0 or 1.

We require that each row and the first two columns have even parity, and the final column has odd parity.

This translates into 6 linear equations over \mathbb{Z}_2 :

$$A \oplus B \oplus C = 0$$

$$A \oplus D \oplus G = 0$$

$$D \oplus E \oplus F = 0$$

$$B \oplus E \oplus H = 0$$

$$G \oplus H \oplus I = 0$$

$$C \oplus F \oplus I = 1$$

The Mermin Magic Square

A	B	C
D	E	F
G	H	I

The values we can observe for these variables are 0 or 1.

We require that each row and the first two columns have even parity, and the final column has odd parity.

This translates into 6 linear equations over \mathbb{Z}_2 :

$$A \oplus B \oplus C = 0 \qquad A \oplus D \oplus G = 0$$

$$D \oplus E \oplus F = 0 \qquad B \oplus E \oplus H = 0$$

$$G \oplus H \oplus I = 0 \qquad C \oplus F \oplus I = 1$$

Of course, the equations are not satisfiable in \mathbb{Z}_2 !

Alice-Bob games for binary constraint systems

Alice-Bob games for binary constraint systems

Alice and Bob can share prior information, but cannot communicate once the game starts.

Alice-Bob games for binary constraint systems

Alice and Bob can share prior information, but cannot communicate once the game starts.

Verifier sends an **equation** to Alice, and a **variable** to Bob.

Alice-Bob games for binary constraint systems

Alice and Bob can share prior information, but cannot communicate once the game starts.

Verifier sends an **equation** to Alice, and a **variable** to Bob.

They win if Alice returns a satisfying assignment for the equation, and Bob returns a value for the variable consistent with Alice's assignment.

Alice-Bob games for binary constraint systems

Alice and Bob can share prior information, but cannot communicate once the game starts.

Verifier sends an **equation** to Alice, and a **variable** to Bob.

They win if Alice returns a satisfying assignment for the equation, and Bob returns a value for the variable consistent with Alice's assignment.

A perfect strategy is one which wins with probability 1.

Alice-Bob games for binary constraint systems

Alice and Bob can share prior information, but cannot communicate once the game starts.

Verifier sends an **equation** to Alice, and a **variable** to Bob.

They win if Alice returns a satisfying assignment for the equation, and Bob returns a value for the variable consistent with Alice's assignment.

A perfect strategy is one which wins with probability 1.

Classically, A-B have a perfect strategy if and only if there is a satisfying assignment for the equations.

Alice-Bob games for binary constraint systems

Alice and Bob can share prior information, but cannot communicate once the game starts.

Verifier sends an **equation** to Alice, and a **variable** to Bob.

They win if Alice returns a satisfying assignment for the equation, and Bob returns a value for the variable consistent with Alice's assignment.

A perfect strategy is one which wins with probability 1.

Classically, A-B have a perfect strategy if and only if there is a satisfying assignment for the equations.

Mermin's construction shows that there is a **quantum perfect strategy** for the magic square.

Contextuality as a resource in quantum computation

Contextuality as a resource in quantum computation

- Measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC)
Naturally resource-based
Results by Raussendorf, *Contextuality in measurement-based quantum computation*,
ABM *Contextual fraction as a measure of contextuality*

Contextuality as a resource in quantum computation

- Measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC)
Naturally resource-based
Results by Raussendorf, *Contextuality in measurement-based quantum computation*,
ABM *Contextual fraction as a measure of contextuality*
- Magic state distillation
Howard, Wallman, Veitch, Emerson *Contextuality supplies the magic for quantum computation*

Contextuality as a resource in quantum computation

- Measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC)
Naturally resource-based
Results by Raussendorf, *Contextuality in measurement-based quantum computation*,
ABM *Contextual fraction as a measure of contextuality*
- Magic state distillation
Howard, Wallman, Veitch, Emerson *Contextuality supplies the magic for quantum computation*
- Shallow circuits
Bravyi, Gossett, Koenig *Quantum advantage with shallow circuits*

Contextuality as a resource in quantum computation

- Measurement-based quantum computation (MBQC)
Naturally resource-based
Results by Raussendorf, *Contextuality in measurement-based quantum computation*,
ABM *Contextual fraction as a measure of contextuality*
- Magic state distillation
Howard, Wallman, Veitch, Emerson *Contextuality supplies the magic for quantum computation*
- Shallow circuits
Bravyi, Gossett, Koenig *Quantum advantage with shallow circuits*

We will hear more about these ideas in talks by Nadish de Silva and Sivert Aasnaess.

Structure of resources

Two views:

Structure of resources

Two views:

- Resource theories (coming from physics)

We have “free operations” which do not use any of the resource in question. Resource B can be obtained from resource A if it can be built from A using free operations.

Two resources are **equivalent** if each can be built from the other.

Structure of resources

Two views:

- Resource theories (coming from physics)

We have “free operations” which do not use any of the resource in question. Resource B can be obtained from resource A if it can be built from A using free operations.

Two resources are **equivalent** if each can be built from the other.

Resource theories for contextuality were put forward in “Contextual fraction as a measure of contextuality” by ABM, and “Non-contextual wirings” by Amaral, Cabello, Terra Cunha.

Structure of resources

Two views:

- Resource theories (coming from physics)

We have “free operations” which do not use any of the resource in question. Resource B can be obtained from resource A if it can be built from A using free operations.

Two resources are **equivalent** if each can be built from the other.

Resource theories for contextuality were put forward in “Contextual fraction as a measure of contextuality” by ABM, and “Non-contextual wirings” by Amaral, Cabello, Terra Cunha.

- Simulations, reducibility (coming from computer science)

A notion of simulation between systems of behaviours. One resource can be reduced to another if it can be simulated by it.

Structure of resources

Two views:

- Resource theories (coming from physics)

We have “free operations” which do not use any of the resource in question. Resource B can be obtained from resource A if it can be built from A using free operations.

Two resources are **equivalent** if each can be built from the other.

Resource theories for contextuality were put forward in “Contextual fraction as a measure of contextuality” by ABM, and “Non-contextual wirings” by Amaral, Cabello, Terra Cunha.

- Simulations, reducibility (coming from computer science)

A notion of simulation between systems of behaviours. One resource can be reduced to another if it can be simulated by it.

Examples: (in)computability, degrees of unsolvability etc.

Complexity classes.

Formalizing Contextuality: Measurement scenarios

Formalizing Contextuality: Measurement scenarios

These are **types** in logical/CS terms. Types of experimental set-up.

Formalizing Contextuality: Measurement scenarios

These are **types** in logical/CS terms. Types of experimental set-up.

A scenario is (X, \mathcal{M}, O) , where

Formalizing Contextuality: Measurement scenarios

These are **types** in logical/CS terms. Types of experimental set-up.

A scenario is (X, \mathcal{M}, O) , where

- X is a set of **variables** or **measurement labels**

Formalizing Contextuality: Measurement scenarios

These are **types** in logical/CS terms. Types of experimental set-up.

A scenario is (X, \mathcal{M}, O) , where

- X is a set of **variables** or **measurement labels**
- \mathcal{M} is a family of subsets of X – the **contexts**, or compatible subsets

Formalizing Contextuality: Measurement scenarios

These are **types** in logical/CS terms. Types of experimental set-up.

A scenario is (X, \mathcal{M}, O) , where

- X is a set of **variables** or **measurement labels**
- \mathcal{M} is a family of subsets of X – the **contexts**, or compatible subsets
- $O = \{O_x\}_{x \in X}$ is a set of **outcomes** or values for the variables.

Formalizing Contextuality: Measurement scenarios

These are **types** in logical/CS terms. Types of experimental set-up.

A scenario is (X, \mathcal{M}, O) , where

- X is a set of **variables** or **measurement labels**
- \mathcal{M} is a family of subsets of X – the **contexts**, or compatible subsets
- $O = \{O_x\}_{x \in X}$ is a set of **outcomes** or values for the variables.

Two variants of \mathcal{M} , which is a hypergraph: either the maximal contexts (no inclusions), or closure under subsets.

Formalizing Contextuality: Measurement scenarios

These are **types** in logical/CS terms. Types of experimental set-up.

A scenario is (X, \mathcal{M}, O) , where

- X is a set of **variables** or **measurement labels**
- \mathcal{M} is a family of subsets of X – the **contexts**, or compatible subsets
- $O = \{O_x\}_{x \in X}$ is a set of **outcomes** or values for the variables.

Two variants of \mathcal{M} , which is a hypergraph: either the maximal contexts (no inclusions), or closure under subsets.

In the latter case, we have an **abstract simplicial complex**.

Example

Example

	$(0, 0)$	$(0, 1)$	$(1, 0)$	$(1, 1)$
(a, b)	$1/2$	0	0	$1/2$
(a, b')	$3/8$	$1/8$	$1/8$	$3/8$
(a', b)	$3/8$	$1/8$	$1/8$	$3/8$
(a', b')	$1/8$	$3/8$	$3/8$	$1/8$

Example

	(0, 0)	(0, 1)	(1, 0)	(1, 1)
(a, b)	1/2	0	0	1/2
(a, b')	3/8	1/8	1/8	3/8
(a', b)	3/8	1/8	1/8	3/8
(a', b')	1/8	3/8	3/8	1/8

In this table, the set of variables is $X = \{a, a', b, b'\}$.

Example

	(0, 0)	(0, 1)	(1, 0)	(1, 1)
(a, b)	1/2	0	0	1/2
(a, b')	3/8	1/8	1/8	3/8
(a', b)	3/8	1/8	1/8	3/8
(a', b')	1/8	3/8	3/8	1/8

In this table, the set of variables is $X = \{a, a', b, b'\}$.

The measurement contexts are:

$$\{\{a_1, b_1\}, \{a_2, b_1\}, \{a_1, b_2\}, \{a_2, b_2\}\}$$

Example

	(0, 0)	(0, 1)	(1, 0)	(1, 1)
(a, b)	1/2	0	0	1/2
(a, b')	3/8	1/8	1/8	3/8
(a', b)	3/8	1/8	1/8	3/8
(a', b')	1/8	3/8	3/8	1/8

In this table, the set of variables is $X = \{a, a', b, b'\}$.

The measurement contexts are:

$$\{\{a_1, b_1\}, \{a_2, b_1\}, \{a_1, b_2\}, \{a_2, b_2\}\}$$

The outcomes are

$$O = \{0, 1\}$$

Basic events are local sections

Basic events are local sections

A basic event is to measure all the variables in a context $C \in \mathcal{M}$, and observe the outcomes.

Basic events are local sections

A basic event is to measure all the variables in a context $C \in \mathcal{M}$, and observe the outcomes.

This is represented by a tuple $s \in \prod_{x \in C} O_x$.

Basic events are local sections

A basic event is to measure all the variables in a context $C \in \mathcal{M}$, and observe the outcomes.

This is represented by a tuple $s \in \prod_{x \in C} O_x$.

Example: if $C = \{a, b\}$, $O_a = \{0, 1\}$, $O_b = \{+1, -1\}$, such an outcome might be

$$s = \{a \mapsto 0, b \mapsto -1\}$$

Basic events are local sections

A basic event is to measure all the variables in a context $C \in \mathcal{M}$, and observe the outcomes.

This is represented by a tuple $s \in \prod_{x \in C} O_x$.

Example: if $C = \{a, b\}$, $O_a = \{0, 1\}$, $O_b = \{+1, -1\}$, such an outcome might be

$$s = \{a \mapsto 0, b \mapsto -1\}$$

This is a **local section**, since it is defined only on C , not on the whole of X !

Basic events are local sections

A basic event is to measure all the variables in a context $C \in \mathcal{M}$, and observe the outcomes.

This is represented by a tuple $s \in \prod_{x \in C} O_x$.

Example: if $C = \{a, b\}$, $O_a = \{0, 1\}$, $O_b = \{+1, -1\}$, such an outcome might be

$$s = \{a \mapsto 0, b \mapsto -1\}$$

This is a **local section**, since it is defined only on C , not on the whole of X !

Basic operation of restriction (projection):

$$\text{if } C \subseteq C', s \in \prod_{x \in C'} O_x, \text{ then } s|_C \in \prod_{x \in C} O_x.$$

Basic events are local sections

A basic event is to measure all the variables in a context $C \in \mathcal{M}$, and observe the outcomes.

This is represented by a tuple $s \in \prod_{x \in C} O_x$.

Example: if $C = \{a, b\}$, $O_a = \{0, 1\}$, $O_b = \{+1, -1\}$, such an outcome might be

$$s = \{a \mapsto 0, b \mapsto -1\}$$

This is a **local section**, since it is defined only on C , not on the whole of X !

Basic operation of restriction (projection):

$$\text{if } C \subseteq C', s \in \prod_{x \in C'} O_x, \text{ then } s|_C \in \prod_{x \in C} O_x.$$

E.g. $s|_{\{a\}} = \{a \mapsto 0\}$.

Formalizing Contextuality: Empirical models

Empirical model $e : (X, \mathcal{M}, O)$:

$$e = \{e_C \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in C} O_x) \mid C \in \mathcal{M}\}$$

Formalizing Contextuality: Empirical models

Empirical model $e : (X, \mathcal{M}, O)$:

$$e = \{e_C \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in C} O_x) \mid C \in \mathcal{M}\}$$

In other words, the empirical model specifies a probability distribution over the events in each context.

Formalizing Contextuality: Empirical models

Empirical model $e : (X, \mathcal{M}, O)$:

$$e = \{e_C \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in C} O_x) \mid C \in \mathcal{M}\}$$

In other words, the empirical model specifies a probability distribution over the events in each context.

These distributions are the rows of our probability tables.

Formalizing Contextuality: Empirical models

Empirical model $e : (X, \mathcal{M}, O)$:

$$e = \{e_C \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in C} O_x) \mid C \in \mathcal{M}\}$$

In other words, the empirical model specifies a probability distribution over the events in each context.

These distributions are the rows of our probability tables.

Thus we have a family of probability distributions over **different**, but **coherently related**, sample spaces.

Formalizing Contextuality: Empirical models

Empirical model $e : (X, \mathcal{M}, O)$:

$$e = \{e_C \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in C} O_x) \mid C \in \mathcal{M}\}$$

In other words, the empirical model specifies a probability distribution over the events in each context.

These distributions are the rows of our probability tables.

Thus we have a family of probability distributions over **different**, but **coherently related**, sample spaces.

(The coherent relationship is functoriality!)

Restriction and Compatibility

Restriction and Compatibility

We would like to express the condition that an empirical model is **compatible**, *i.e.* “locally consistent”.

Restriction and Compatibility

We would like to express the condition that an empirical model is **compatible**, *i.e.* “locally consistent”.

We want to do this by saying that the distributions “agree on overlaps”. For all $C, C' \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$e_C|_{C \cap C'} = e_{C'}|_{C \cap C'}.$$

Restriction and Compatibility

We would like to express the condition that an empirical model is **compatible**, *i.e.* “locally consistent”.

We want to do this by saying that the distributions “agree on overlaps”. For all $C, C' \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$e_C|_{C \cap C'} = e_{C'}|_{C \cap C'}.$$

Cf. the usual notion of compatibility of a family of functions defined on subsets.

Restriction and Compatibility

We would like to express the condition that an empirical model is **compatible**, i.e. “locally consistent”.

We want to do this by saying that the distributions “agree on overlaps”. For all $C, C' \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$e_C|_{C \cap C'} = e_{C'}|_{C \cap C'}.$$

Cf. the usual notion of compatibility of a family of functions defined on subsets.

Marginalization of distributions: if $C' \subseteq C$, $d \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in C} O_x)$,

$$d|_{C'}(s) := \sum_{t \in \prod_{x \in C} O_x, t|_{C'}=s} d(t)$$

Restriction and Compatibility

We would like to express the condition that an empirical model is **compatible**, *i.e.* “locally consistent”.

We want to do this by saying that the distributions “agree on overlaps”. For all $C, C' \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$e_C|_{C \cap C'} = e_{C'}|_{C \cap C'}.$$

Cf. the usual notion of compatibility of a family of functions defined on subsets.

Marginalization of distributions: if $C' \subseteq C$, $d \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in C} O_x)$,

$$d|_{C'}(s) := \sum_{t \in \prod_{x \in C} O_x, t|_{C'}=s} d(t)$$

Compatibility is a general form of the important physical principle of **No-Signalling**; this general form is also known as **No Disturbance**.

Contextuality defined

Contextuality defined

An empirical model $\{e_C\}_{C \in \mathcal{M}}$ on a measurement scenario (X, \mathcal{M}, O) is **non-contextual** if there is a distribution $d \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in X} O_x)$ such that, for all $C \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$d|_C = e_C.$$

Contextuality defined

An empirical model $\{e_C\}_{C \in \mathcal{M}}$ on a measurement scenario (X, \mathcal{M}, O) is **non-contextual** if there is a distribution $d \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in X} O_x)$ such that, for all $C \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$d|_C = e_C.$$

That is, we can glue all the local information together into a global consistent description from which the local information can be recovered.

Contextuality defined

An empirical model $\{e_C\}_{C \in \mathcal{M}}$ on a measurement scenario (X, \mathcal{M}, O) is **non-contextual** if there is a distribution $d \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in X} O_x)$ such that, for all $C \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$d|_C = e_C.$$

That is, we can glue all the local information together into a global consistent description from which the local information can be recovered.

We call such a d a **global section**.

Contextuality defined

An empirical model $\{e_C\}_{C \in \mathcal{M}}$ on a measurement scenario (X, \mathcal{M}, O) is **non-contextual** if there is a distribution $d \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in X} O_x)$ such that, for all $C \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$d|_C = e_C.$$

That is, we can glue all the local information together into a global consistent description from which the local information can be recovered.

We call such a d a **global section**.

If no such global section exists, the empirical model is **contextual**.

Contextuality defined

An empirical model $\{e_C\}_{C \in \mathcal{M}}$ on a measurement scenario (X, \mathcal{M}, O) is **non-contextual** if there is a distribution $d \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in X} O_x)$ such that, for all $C \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$d|_C = e_C.$$

That is, we can glue all the local information together into a global consistent description from which the local information can be recovered.

We call such a d a **global section**.

If no such global section exists, the empirical model is **contextual**.

Thus contextuality arises where we have a family of data which is **locally consistent** but **globally inconsistent**.

Contextuality defined

An empirical model $\{e_C\}_{C \in \mathcal{M}}$ on a measurement scenario (X, \mathcal{M}, O) is **non-contextual** if there is a distribution $d \in \text{Prob}(\prod_{x \in X} O_x)$ such that, for all $C \in \mathcal{M}$:

$$d|_C = e_C.$$

That is, we can glue all the local information together into a global consistent description from which the local information can be recovered.



We call such a d a **global section**.

If no such global section exists, the empirical model is **contextual**.

Thus contextuality arises where we have a family of data which is **locally consistent** but **globally inconsistent**.


The import of Bell's theorem and similar results is that there are empirical models arising from quantum mechanics which are contextual.

Visualizing Contextuality




The Hardy table and the PR box as bundles

Simulations




Simulations



To simulate B by A :


Simulations



To simulate B by A :

- map inputs of B (measurements) to inputs of A


Simulations



To simulate B by A :

- map inputs of B (measurements) to inputs of A
- map outputs of A (measurement outcomes) to outputs of B

Simulations




To simulate B by A :

- map inputs of B (measurements) to inputs of A
- map outputs of A (measurement outcomes) to outputs of B

This is a simple notion of simulation, but already covers several things:

Simulations




To simulate B by A :

- map inputs of B (measurements) to inputs of A
- map outputs of A (measurement outcomes) to outputs of B

This is a simple notion of simulation, but already covers several things:

- It allows for relabelling of measurements and outcomes (**isomorphisms**).

Simulations




To simulate B by A :

- map inputs of B (measurements) to inputs of A
- map outputs of A (measurement outcomes) to outputs of B

This is a simple notion of simulation, but already covers several things:

- It allows for relabelling of measurements and outcomes (**isomorphisms**).
- Since the map on measurements needn't be surjective, it allows for simulating B using only part of A (**restrictions**).

Simulations



To simulate B by A :

- map inputs of B (measurements) to inputs of A
- map outputs of A (measurement outcomes) to outputs of B

This is a simple notion of simulation, but already covers several things:

- It allows for relabelling of measurements and outcomes (**isomorphisms**).
- Since the map on measurements needn't be surjective, it allows for simulating B using only part of A (**restrictions**).
- Since the map on outcomes needn't be injective, it allows for **coarse-graining** of outcomes.

Simulations formalized

Note the basic character of the fact that mappings of inputs go backward, of outputs forward:

Simulations formalized

Note the basic character of the fact that mappings of inputs go backward, of outputs forward:

Mathematically, this is the fact that the Hom functor is **contravariant** in its first argument, **covariant** in its second.

Simulations formalized

Note the basic character of the fact that mappings of inputs go backward, of outputs forward:

Mathematically, this is the fact that the Hom functor is **contravariant** in its first argument, **covariant** in its second.

Logically, to reduce one implication to another, we must **weaken** the antecedent, and **strengthen** the consequent.

Simulations formalized

Note the basic character of the fact that mappings of inputs go backward, of outputs forward:

Mathematically, this is the fact that the Hom functor is **contravariant** in its first argument, **covariant** in its second.

Logically, to reduce one implication to another, we must **weaken** the antecedent, and **strengthen** the consequent.

Formally, a morphism of scenarios $(\pi, h) : (X, \Sigma, O) \rightarrow (Y, \Delta, P)$ is given by:

- A simplicial map $\pi : \Delta \rightarrow \Sigma$.
- For each $y \in Y$ a map $h_y : O_{\pi(y)} \rightarrow P_y$.

Simulations formalized

Note the basic character of the fact that mappings of inputs go backward, of outputs forward:

Mathematically, this is the fact that the Hom functor is **contravariant** in its first argument, **covariant** in its second.

Logically, to reduce one implication to another, we must **weaken** the antecedent, and **strengthen** the consequent.

Formally, a morphism of scenarios $(\pi, h) : (X, \Sigma, O) \rightarrow (Y, \Delta, P)$ is given by:

- A simplicial map $\pi : \Delta \rightarrow \Sigma$.
- For each $y \in Y$ a map $h_y : O_{\pi(y)} \rightarrow P_y$.

Note that the map π must be simplicial, since it must map compatible sets of measurements (contexts) in Δ to compatible sets of measurements (contexts) in Σ .

Basic simulations

A morphism of scenarios induces a natural action on empirical models:

Basic simulations

A morphism of scenarios induces a natural action on empirical models:

If e is an empirical model on (X, Σ, O) , then $(\pi, h)^*e$ is an empirical model on (Y, Δ, P) , given by:

$$(\pi, h)^*(e)_C = D(\gamma)(e_{\pi(C)})$$

the push-forward of the probability measure $e_{\pi(C)}$ along the map

$$\gamma : \prod_{x \in \pi(C)} O_x \rightarrow \prod_{y \in C} P_y$$

given by $\gamma(s)_y = h_y(s_{\pi(y)})$.

Basic simulations

A morphism of scenarios induces a natural action on empirical models:

If e is an empirical model on (X, Σ, O) , then $(\pi, h)^*e$ is an empirical model on (Y, Δ, P) , given by:

$$(\pi, h)^*(e)_C = D(\gamma)(e_{\pi(C)})$$

the push-forward of the probability measure $e_{\pi(C)}$ along the map

$$\gamma : \prod_{x \in \pi(C)} O_x \rightarrow \prod_{y \in C} P_y$$

given by $\gamma(s)_y = h_y(s_{\pi(y)})$.

This gives a category **Emp**, with objects $e : (X, \Sigma, O)$, and morphisms $(\pi, h) : e \rightarrow e'$ such that $(\pi, h)^*(e) = e'$.

General simulations

Basic simulations are useful, but limited.

General simulations

Basic simulations are useful, but limited.

To get a robust, general notion of simulation, we introduce a notion of **measurement protocols** over a given scenario.

General simulations

Basic simulations are useful, but limited.

To get a robust, general notion of simulation, we introduce a notion of **measurement protocols** over a given scenario.

These protocols proceed recursively by first performing a measurement over the given scenario, and then conditioning their further measurements on the outcome.

General simulations

Basic simulations are useful, but limited.

To get a robust, general notion of simulation, we introduce a notion of **measurement protocols** over a given scenario.

These protocols proceed recursively by first performing a measurement over the given scenario, and then conditioning their further measurements on the outcome.

Note that different paths can lead into different, **incompatible** contexts.

General simulations

Basic simulations are useful, but limited.

To get a robust, general notion of simulation, we introduce a notion of **measurement protocols** over a given scenario.

These protocols proceed recursively by first performing a measurement over the given scenario, and then conditioning their further measurements on the outcome.

Note that different paths can lead into different, **incompatible** contexts.

Thus they incorporate adaptive classical processing, of the kind used e.g. in Measurement-Based Quantum Computing.

General simulations

Basic simulations are useful, but limited.

To get a robust, general notion of simulation, we introduce a notion of **measurement protocols** over a given scenario.

These protocols proceed recursively by first performing a measurement over the given scenario, and then conditioning their further measurements on the outcome.

Note that different paths can lead into different, **incompatible** contexts.

Thus they incorporate adaptive classical processing, of the kind used e.g. in Measurement-Based Quantum Computing.

Such protocols were previously considered by Acin, Fritz, Leverrier, Sainz, “A combinatorial approach to nonlocality and contextuality”.

General simulations

Basic simulations are useful, but limited.

To get a robust, general notion of simulation, we introduce a notion of **measurement protocols** over a given scenario.

These protocols proceed recursively by first performing a measurement over the given scenario, and then conditioning their further measurements on the outcome.

Note that different paths can lead into different, **incompatible** contexts.

Thus they incorporate adaptive classical processing, of the kind used e.g. in Measurement-Based Quantum Computing.

Such protocols were previously considered by Acin, Fritz, Leverrier, Sainz, “A combinatorial approach to nonlocality and contextuality”.

Formally, we construct a **comonad** MP on the category of empirical models, where $MP(e : (X, \Sigma, O))$ is the empirical model obtained by taking all measurement protocols over the given scenario.

The MP construction

Intuitively, given a scenario $\mathbf{X} = (X, \Sigma, O)$ we build a new scenario $\text{MP}(\mathbf{X})$, where:

- measurements are the measurement protocols on \mathbf{X}
- measurement protocols are compatible if they can be combined consistently
- outcomes are the joint outcomes observed during a run of the protocol

The MP construction

Intuitively, given a scenario $\mathbf{X} = (X, \Sigma, O)$ we build a new scenario $\text{MP}(\mathbf{X})$, where:

- measurements are the measurement protocols on \mathbf{X}
- measurement protocols are compatible if they can be combined consistently
- outcomes are the joint outcomes observed during a run of the protocol

The empirical model is then naturally lifted to this scenario.

The MP construction

Intuitively, given a scenario $\mathbf{X} = (X, \Sigma, O)$ we build a new scenario $\text{MP}(\mathbf{X})$, where:

- measurements are the measurement protocols on \mathbf{X}
- measurement protocols are compatible if they can be combined consistently
- outcomes are the joint outcomes observed during a run of the protocol

The empirical model is then naturally lifted to this scenario.

Given empirical models e and d , a **simulation** of e by d is a map

$$d \otimes c \rightarrow e$$

in \mathbf{Emp}_{MP} , the coKleisli category of MP, *i.e.* a map

$$\text{MP}(d \otimes c) \rightarrow e$$

in \mathbf{Emp} , for some noncontextual model c .

The MP construction

Intuitively, given a scenario $\mathbf{X} = (X, \Sigma, O)$ we build a new scenario $\text{MP}(\mathbf{X})$, where:

- measurements are the measurement protocols on \mathbf{X}
- measurement protocols are compatible if they can be combined consistently
- outcomes are the joint outcomes observed during a run of the protocol

The empirical model is then naturally lifted to this scenario.

Given empirical models e and d , a **simulation** of e by d is a map

$$d \otimes c \rightarrow e$$

in \mathbf{Emp}_{MP} , the coKleisli category of MP, *i.e.* a map

$$\text{MP}(d \otimes c) \rightarrow e$$

in \mathbf{Emp} , for some noncontextual model c .

The use of the noncontextual model c is to allow for classical randomness in the simulation.

The MP construction

Intuitively, given a scenario $\mathbf{X} = (X, \Sigma, O)$ we build a new scenario $\text{MP}(\mathbf{X})$, where:

- measurements are the measurement protocols on \mathbf{X}
- measurement protocols are compatible if they can be combined consistently
- outcomes are the joint outcomes observed during a run of the protocol

The empirical model is then naturally lifted to this scenario.

Given empirical models e and d , a **simulation** of e by d is a map

$$d \otimes c \rightarrow e$$

in \mathbf{Emp}_{MP} , the coKleisli category of MP, *i.e.* a map

$$\text{MP}(d \otimes c) \rightarrow e$$

in \mathbf{Emp} , for some noncontextual model c .

The use of the noncontextual model c is to allow for classical randomness in the simulation.

We denote the existence of a simulation of e by d as $d \rightsquigarrow e$, read “ d simulates e ”.

Results

We give a brief prospectus of results from the LiCS paper. Martti will discuss these in more detail in his talk.

Results

We give a brief prospectus of results from the LiCS paper. Martti will discuss these in more detail in his talk.

- We consider the algebraic operations previously introduced in the Contextual fraction paper, and introduce a new operation allowing a conditional measurement, a one-step version of adaptivity.

Results

We give a brief prospectus of results from the LiCS paper. Martti will discuss these in more detail in his talk.

- We consider the algebraic operations previously introduced in the Contextual fraction paper, and introduce a new operation allowing a conditional measurement, a one-step version of adaptivity.

We present an equational theory for these operations, and use this to obtain normal forms for resource expressions.

Results

We give a brief prospectus of results from the LiCS paper. Martti will discuss these in more detail in his talk.

- We consider the algebraic operations previously introduced in the Contextual fraction paper, and introduce a new operation allowing a conditional measurement, a one-step version of adaptivity.

We present an equational theory for these operations, and use this to obtain normal forms for resource expressions.

- Using these normal forms, we obtain one of our main results: we show that the algebraic notion of convertibility coincides with the existence of a simulation morphism.

Results

We give a brief prospectus of results from the LiCS paper. Martti will discuss these in more detail in his talk.

- We consider the algebraic operations previously introduced in the Contextual fraction paper, and introduce a new operation allowing a conditional measurement, a one-step version of adaptivity.

We present an equational theory for these operations, and use this to obtain normal forms for resource expressions.

- Using these normal forms, we obtain one of our main results: we show that the algebraic notion of convertibility coincides with the existence of a simulation morphism.
- We also prove a number of further results, including a form of no-cloning theorem at the abstract level of simulations.

Degrees of Contextuality

The relation $d \rightsquigarrow e$ is a preorder on empirical models. The induced equivalence classes are the **degrees of contextuality**. They are partially ordered by the existence of simulations between representatives.

Degrees of Contextuality

The relation $d \rightsquigarrow e$ is a preorder on empirical models. The induced equivalence classes are the **degrees of contextuality**. They are partially ordered by the existence of simulations between representatives.

This allows a much finer classification of contextual behaviours than any particular numerical measure of contextuality.

(N.B. If $d \rightsquigarrow e$, then $\text{CF}(d) \geq \text{CF}(e)$).

Degrees of Contextuality

The relation $d \rightsquigarrow e$ is a preorder on empirical models. The induced equivalence classes are the **degrees of contextuality**. They are partially ordered by the existence of simulations between representatives.

This allows a much finer classification of contextual behaviours than any particular numerical measure of contextuality.

(N.B. If $d \rightsquigarrow e$, then $\text{CF}(d) \geq \text{CF}(e)$).

This partial order can be seen as a fundamental structure in the study of quantum resources.

Degrees of Contextuality

The relation $d \rightsquigarrow e$ is a preorder on empirical models. The induced equivalence classes are the **degrees of contextuality**. They are partially ordered by the existence of simulations between representatives.

This allows a much finer classification of contextual behaviours than any particular numerical measure of contextuality.

(N.B. If $d \rightsquigarrow e$, then $\text{CF}(d) \geq \text{CF}(e)$).

This partial order can be seen as a fundamental structure in the study of quantum resources.

E.g. we can ask: How rich is this order?

Degrees of Contextuality

The relation $d \rightsquigarrow e$ is a preorder on empirical models. The induced equivalence classes are the **degrees of contextuality**. They are partially ordered by the existence of simulations between representatives.

This allows a much finer classification of contextual behaviours than any particular numerical measure of contextuality.

(N.B. If $d \rightsquigarrow e$, then $\text{CF}(d) \geq \text{CF}(e)$).

This partial order can be seen as a fundamental structure in the study of quantum resources.

E.g. we can ask: How rich is this order?

Existing results in the non-locality literature can be leveraged to prove the following theorem.

Theorem

The order contains both infinite strict chains, and infinite antichains.

Degrees of Contextuality

The relation $d \rightsquigarrow e$ is a preorder on empirical models. The induced equivalence classes are the **degrees of contextuality**. They are partially ordered by the existence of simulations between representatives.

This allows a much finer classification of contextual behaviours than any particular numerical measure of contextuality.

(N.B. If $d \rightsquigarrow e$, then $\text{CF}(d) \geq \text{CF}(e)$).

This partial order can be seen as a fundamental structure in the study of quantum resources.

E.g. we can ask: How rich is this order?

Existing results in the non-locality literature can be leveraged to prove the following theorem.

Theorem

The order contains both infinite strict chains, and infinite antichains.

This is just a preliminary observation. Many questions arise, and there are natural variations and refinements.

Generalized Vorob'ev theory

The property of (non)contextuality itself can be equivalently formulated as the existence of a simulation by an empirical model over the empty scenario.

(N.B. $MP(\mathbf{0}) = \mathbf{1}$).

Generalized Vorob'ev theory

The property of (non)contextuality itself can be equivalently formulated as the existence of a simulation by an empirical model over the empty scenario.

(N.B. $MP(\mathbf{0}) = \mathbf{1}$).

This suggests that much of contextuality theory can be generalized to a “relative” form.

Generalized Vorob'ev theory

The property of (non)contextuality itself can be equivalently formulated as the existence of a simulation by an empirical model over the empty scenario.

(N.B. $MP(\mathbf{0}) = \mathbf{1}$).

This suggests that much of contextuality theory can be generalized to a “relative” form.

As an example, consider the classic theorem of Vorob'ev. It characterizes those scenarios over which all empirical models are noncontextual, in terms of an acyclicity condition on the underlying simplicial complex.

Generalized Vorob'ev theory

The property of (non)contextuality itself can be equivalently formulated as the existence of a simulation by an empirical model over the empty scenario.

(N.B. $MP(\mathbf{0}) = \mathbf{1}$).

This suggests that much of contextuality theory can be generalized to a “relative” form.

As an example, consider the classic theorem of Vorob'ev. It characterizes those scenarios over which all empirical models are noncontextual, in terms of an acyclicity condition on the underlying simplicial complex.

This can be formulated as characterizing those scenarios such that every model over them can be simulated by a model over the empty scenario.

Generalized Vorob'ev theory

The property of (non)contextuality itself can be equivalently formulated as the existence of a simulation by an empirical model over the empty scenario.

(N.B. $MP(\mathbf{0}) = \mathbf{1}$).

This suggests that much of contextuality theory can be generalized to a “relative” form.

As an example, consider the classic theorem of Vorob'ev. It characterizes those scenarios over which all empirical models are noncontextual, in terms of an acyclicity condition on the underlying simplicial complex.

This can be formulated as characterizing those scenarios such that every model over them can be simulated by a model over the empty scenario.

More generally, we can ask for conditions on scenarios (X, Σ, O) and (Y, Δ, P) such that every empirical model over (Y, Δ, P) can be simulated by some empirical model over (X, Σ, O) .